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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE SUPREME COURT 
UPHOLDS THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FEDERAL 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES. Mistretta v. United States, 488 
U.S. 361 (1989). 
In 1984, President Reagan signed into law the Sentencing Reform 
Act of 19841 establishing the United States Sentencing Commission 
(Commission). The Commission was charged with developing the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines).2 In November 1987, the 
Guidelines took effect. 3 A majority of district courts held the Guide-
lines to be unconstitutional, on the basis that they violated the 
separation of powers doctrine. In January 1989, however, the Su-
preme Court held the Guidelines to be constitutional. 4 This Casenote 
examines the arguments and rationales involved in determining the 
constitutionality of the Guidelines. 
The policies behind the creation of the Commission were to 
"provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing 
[and] avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants 
with similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal 
conduct."s Congress noted that "in many cases, current sentences 
do not accurately reflect the seriousness of the offense."6 
The Commission promulgated the Guidelines, establishing a sen-
tencing table7 upon which an offense level is determined. The level 
is. adjusted to reflect the defendant's circumstances, conduct, and 
prior record. The sentencing judge enters a sentence within a desig-
nated range, unless there are unusual circumstances.8 If there are 
1. Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 211, 217(a), 98 Stat. 1987, 2017 (1984) (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586 (1988». 
2. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL (1990) [hereinafter GUIDELINES]. The Commission may submit amend-
ments to the Guidelines each year to Congress between the beginning of a 
regular session and the first day of May. 28 U.S.C. § 994(P) (1988). Such 
amendments shall take effect 180 days after submission, unless a law is enacted 
to the contrary. [d. 
3. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 235, 98 Stat. 2017, 2031 (1984). 
4. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
5. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(I)(B) (1988). 
6. [d. § 994(m). 
7. GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 235. 
8. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988). Although there is no clear definition of what 
constitutes unusual circumstances, the provision gives the trial judge the dis-
cretion to depart from the Guidelines if "the court finds that there exists an 
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately 
taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the 
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unusual circumstances, the judge may depart from the Guidelines, 
provided the reasons are specified.9 
The Act placed the Commission within the judicial branch and 
provided that the Commission be composed of seven voting and two 
nonvoting members. The members are nominated by the President lO 
and ratified by the Senate, and at least three must be federal judges" 1 
This unique relationship between the three branches of government 
gave rise to attacks upon the Guidelines' constitutionality. 
The challenges to the constitutionality of the Guidelines focused 
on both the improper delegation of power and the doctrine of 
separation of powers. Specifically, the challenges attacked Congress' 
capacity to delegate authority to the Commission, whether Congress 
had located the Commission within an appropriate branch, and 
whether, as a result of the above, the independent branches exceeded 
their authority. 
The nondelegation doctrine prohibits Congress from delegating 
its power to the other branches of government. 12 In general, it is 
constitutionally impermissible for Congress to relinquish significant 
legislative power.13 Opponents of the Guidelines have asserted that 
Congress has improperly delegated its power to define and establish 
penalties. 14 
Congress can, however, delegate its authority if the delegation 
is not excessive. Whether delegation is excessive depends upon the 
degree of guidance furnished by Congress to the delegated body. 
Proper delegation of legislative authority would require adequate 
guidance to the Commission to assure that the Guidelines "compl[y] 
guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described." [d. 
In addition, the trial judge has the power to reduce a sentence to a level below 
that prescribed to reflect a "defendant's substantial assistance in the investi-
gation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense." [d. 
§ 3553(e). 
9. [d. § 3553(b). 
10. Most members of judicial branch agencies are appointed and removed by article 
III judges. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 601-620 (1988) (Supreme Court has appoint-
ment and removal power over the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts). 
11. 28 U.S.C. § 99l(a) (1988). The Mistretta Court noted, however, that service 
on the Commission is voluntary and that a judge could not be compelled to 
serve against his will. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 405-06. 
12. "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the 
United States .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
13. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). "The 
Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential 
legislative functions with which it is thus vested." [d. at 529. 
14. See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz-Villanueva, 680 F. Supp. 1411, 1415-16 (S.D. Cal. 
1988). 
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with the legislative will. "15 Therefore, if a congressional act proclaims 
a clear and intelligible principle to which the authorized body is 
directed to conform, "such legislative action is not a forbidden 
delegation of legislative power." 16 
In analyzing whether the Guidelines enunciated clear and intel-
ligible principles, the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of California in United States v. Ruiz-Villanueval7 noted that 
Congress "carefully outlined its sentencing philosophy."IS The court 
stated that "Congress explicitly instructed the Commission on what 
to do . . . and how to do it . . . commented on numerous other 
matters attendant to formation of the Guidelines ... [and] retained 
for itself the power to fix maximum sentence lengths."19 Accordingly, 
the court held that Congress did articulate intelligible principles, and 
thus, the delegation of power to the Commission was permissible.20 
The Guidelines were again held to be a proper exercise of 
congressional delegation of power in United States v. Chambless. 21 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana 
explained that the Act "outlines the policies which prompted estab-
lishment of the Commission, explains what the Commission should 
do and how it should do it, and sets out specific directives to govern 
particular situations."22 
In contrast, the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois in United States v. Eastland23 held the Guidelines 
to be in violation of the nondelegation doctrine, reasoning that 
because a fundamental liberty was at stake, the strict scrutiny test 
should be applied when evaluating the Guidelines.24 While recognizing 
15. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944). "[T]he statute violates the 
Constitution only if there is an absence of standards such that 'it would be 
impossible in a proper proceeding to ascertain whether the will of Congress 
has been obeyed.'" United States v. Costelon, 694 F. Supp. 786,793 (D. Colo. 
1988) (quoting Yakus, 321 U.S. at 426). The court in Costelon concluded that 
the challenge to the guidelines was unpersuasive because "[t]he statute provides 
the Commission with explicit and detailed instructions for formulating the 
guidelines." [d. at 794. 
16. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). 
17. 680 F. Supp. 1411 (S.D. Cal. 1988). 
18. [d. at 1417. 
19. [d. 
20. [d. at 1418. 
21. 680 F. Supp. 793 (E.D. La. 1988). 
22. [d. at 796. 
23. 694 F. Supp. 512 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 
24. [d. at 515-16. A court generally defers to the legislature by analyzing an equal 
protection claim under the "rational basis" test. A piece of legislation is upheld 
if it rests upon any rational basis. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 
U.S. 144, 152 (1938). Where a fundamental right is concerned, however, the 
legislation is "subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny" in which the 
government must show that the legislation is narrowly tailored to advance a 
compelling governmental interest. [d. at 152 n.4. 
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that Congress has the authority to delegate many functions, partic-
ularly those involving economic regulation, the court concluded that 
delegations involving fundamental rights were impermissible.2s 
The Constitution divided the delegated powers of the federal 
government into three branches "to assure, as nearly as possible, 
that each branch of government would confine itself to its assigned 
responsibility. "26 The Supreme Court· has said that Congress cannot 
increase its power at the expense of another branch.27 The Consti-
tution, however, does not establish precisely defined boundaries for 
the three branches.28 Although the powers are functionally identifi-
able,29 the branches are not isolated from each other. 30 
The Supreme Court confronted the separation of powers issue 
in Morrison v. Olson.3l In analyzing whether the Ethics in Govern-
ment AcP2 had violated the separation of powers doctrine, the Court 
addressed whether the Act had unduly interfered with the role of a 
coordinate branch.33 The Act created the office of independent coun-
sel to investigate certain government officials. The Court noted that 
it would present conflicts of interest if the office of independent 
counsel were placed in the executive branch. 
The Olson Court focused upon the extent to which the Act 
prevented the executive branch from accomplishing its constitutionally 
assigned functions. 34 The Court held that because the President has 
long appointed attorneys to perform assorted prosecutorial duties, 
the appointment of an independent counsel does not run afoul of 
the constitutional limitation on interbranch appointments.35 Further-
more, because the Attorney General retains the right to remove the 
independent counsel for good cause, the Act does not impermissibly 
undermine the functions of the executive branch.36 
25. Eastland, 694 F. Supp. at 515-16. 
26. Immigration & Naturalization Servo v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). 
27. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1988). 
28. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 121 (1976) (per curiam). The branches are not 
"hermetically" sealed from one another. "The President is a participant in 
the lawmaking process by virtue of his authority to veto bills .... The Senate 
is a participant in the appointive process by virtue of its authority to refuse 
to confirm persons nominated to office by the President." [d. 
29. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951. 
30. [d. (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 121). 
31. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
32. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1988). The Act allows for the appointment of an 
independent counsel by a specially constituted panel to investigate and prosecute 
government officials for criminal violations upon recommendation by the 
Attorney General. 
33. Olson, 487 U.S. at 695-96. 
34. [d. 
35. [d. 
36. [d. 
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In United States v. Tolbert,37 the United States District Court 
for the District of Kansas applied this functional analysis. The court 
held the Guidelines were unconstitutional because there was a poten-
tial for disruption that was not justified by an overriding need.38 The 
court reasoned that 'because there are three federal judges on the 
panel, the impartiality of judges on the Commission, as well as other 
federal judges, is threatened.39 In United States v. Schwartz,40 how-
ever, the United States District Court for the District of Delaware 
reasoned that "because there is minimal infringement upon the 
Judiciary, just as there was with the Executive Branch," the Guide-
lines do not violate the separation of powers doctrine.41 
The question arises as to whether Congress violated the separa-
tion of powers doctrine by placing a commission that exercises 
executive power and functions within the judicial branch.42 Article 
III, section 2 of the Constitution limits the judicial power of the 
United States to the adjudication of cases and controversies.43 Con-
gress, however, chose to place the Commission in the judicial branch 
because of a "strong feeling that, even under this legislation, sen-
tencing should remain primarily a judicial function."44 
The Tolbert court noted that although Congress may delegate 
to the judiciary the authority to make rules, the rules must be 
37. 682 F. Supp. 1517 (D. Kan. 1988). 
38. [d. at 1527. 
39. [d. 
40. 692 F. Supp. 331 (D. Del. 1988). 
41. [d. at 342. 
42. See United States v. Amesquita-Padilla, 691 F. Supp. 277, 285 (W.D. Wash. 
1988) (holding that placement of the Commission within the judicial branch 
did not violate separation of powers because the Commission served a judicial 
sentencing function). 
43. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) 
(construing the terms "cases" and "controversies" as limitations upon the 
business of federal courts). 
44. S. REp. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 159, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3342. Although the Commission is within the 
judicial branch, power is also granted to the executive branch. Prevailing 
principles, however, prevent an executive agency from prescribing criminal 
penalties. See, e.g., United States v. Howard, 352 U.S. 212 (1957). Because 
the Guidelines provide for "charge offense" sentencing, the prosecutor has 
increased authority over the criminal sanction, and the decision of what charge 
to bring will have a significant effect upon the penalty. GUIDELINES, supra note 
2, at 5-6. With charge offense sentencing, the sentences imposed by the 
Guidelines are not based on the defendant's actual conduct, but on the conduct 
which constitutes the elements of a statutory offense. [d. at 5. In justifying 
the use of a charge offense system, the Commission pointed out that a court 
"may control any inappropriate manipulation ... through use of its power to 
depart from the specific guideline sentence." [d. at 6. 
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procedural in nature. 45 The court reasoned that since the Supreme 
Court stated that Florida's sentencing guidelines were substantive in 
nature,46 the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were also substantive in 
nature and, therefore, not properly within the juditial branchY 
At least one federal judge has considered the issue of placement 
of the Commission in the judicial branch one of semantics only. 48 
"[W]hat must be examined are the function and the powers of the 
Commission . . .. "49 Although in agreement with that statement, the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of California 
in United States v. ArnoldSo held that the Guidelines were invalid 
because the Commission was "performing ... executive duties and 
powers, [and] its location in the Judicial Branch [offended the] U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 2, d. 1."51 
The question of whether the Commission is performing a legis-
lative function within the judiciary also arises. It has been held that 
the authority to define and fix punishment for a particular crime is 
not judicial, but legislativeY The imposition of an individual sen-
tence, however, is a judicial function. 53 
In holding the Guidelines valid, the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Washington in United States v. Ames-
quita-Padilla54 maintained that Congress had not assigned nonjudicial 
executive and legislative functions, but had "established an inde-
pendent commission in the Judicial Branch. "55 Because the funcdon 
of the Commission is to aid judges in the performance of their 
judicial duties,56 the court found "no constitutional infirmity in 
Congress' decision to establish the Commission as an independent 
agency in the judicial branch. "57 The United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in United States v. Whyte,58 
however, reasoned: "Neither the' legislative, the executive, nor the 
45. Tolbert, 682 F. Supp. at 1524 (citing Sib bach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 
14 (1941». 
46. [d. (citing Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 433 (1987». 
47. [d. 
48. See United States v. Ortega-Lopez, 684 F. Supp. 1506, 1516 (C.D. Cal. 1988) 
(Hupp, J., dissenting). 
49. [d. (emphasis added) (stating that the Commission did not violate separation 
of powers). 
50. 678 F. Supp. 1463 (S.D. Cal. 1988). 
51. [d. at 1470. 
52. Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27,42 (1916). 
53. !d. at 41. 
54. 691 F. Supp. 277 (W.D. Wash. 1988). 
55. [d. at 282. 
56. The court drew an analogy to the rule-making power of the judiciary, which 
was upheld in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941). 691 F. Supp. at 
283. 
57. 691 F. Supp. at 284. 
58. 694 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Pa. 1988). 
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Judicial Branch bears the responsibility for the creation of the 
Guidelines. No branch of the government is accountable for their 
policy decisions."s9 The court concluded that "[t]he Judicial Branch 
has no authority to legislate or execute sentences binding on all 
judges. "60 
Although the Constitution contains no express prohibition against 
article III judges serving on independent commissions, it has been 
held that the doctrine of separation of powers was created to prevent 
officials in one branch from taking on the duties of another. 61 "As 
a general rule, ... 'executive or administrative duties of a nonjudicial 
nature may not be imposed on judges holding office under Art. III 
of the Constitution.' "62 Two federal circuits that have addressed the 
issue have reached opposite conclusions regarding the service of 
federal judges on presidential commissions.63 The Eleventh Circuit 
found that judicial service on the President's Commission on Organ-
ized Crime was improper because the judges were placed in a pros-
ecutorial position that may have impaired the judges' neutrality.64 
Conversely, the Third Circuit held that if an impartiality problem 
arose, it could be handled on an individual-case basis.6s 
The Ninth Circuit, in Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele,66 held the 
Guidelines unconstitutional because they obstructed the independence 
of the branches when judges are required to exercise both judicial 
and executive power. 67 The court reasoned that because judges would 
not be permitted to serve in high-level presidential cabinet positions, 
it would be equally impermissible for judges to serve on the Com-
mission.68 
The Congress gave the President the power to appoint and 
remove members of the Commission.69 Because the Commission is 
located in the judicial branch, the issue arises as to whether "the 
removal powers of the President over the Commissioners in the 
59. Id. at 1195. 
60. Id. at 1196. 
61. Immigration & Naturalization Servo V. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). 
62. Morrison V. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677 (1988) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 123 (1976) (per curiam». 
63. See In re President's Comm'n on Org. Crime, Subpoena of Scarfo, 783 F.2d 
370 (3d Cir. 1986); In re President's Comm'n on Org. Crime, Subpoena of 
Scaduto, 763 F.2d 1191 (11th Cir. 1985). 
64. Scaduto, 763 F.2d at 1197-98. 
65. Scarfo, 783 F.2d at 381. 
66. 857 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir. 1988). 
67. Id. at 1259. 
68. Id. at 1259-60. 
69. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1988). The Act provides in part that the members of the 
Commission "shall be subject to removal by the President only for neglect of 
duty or malfeasance in office or for other good cause shown." Id. 
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Judicial Branch violate the separation of powers principles. "70 In 
Bowsher v. Synar,1! the Supreme Court held that the retention by 
Congress of the right to remove an executive officer (the Comptroller 
General) was an unconstitutional violation of the separation of 
powers doctrine.72 As a result of Synar, an argument was made that 
a "judicial commission to be controlled by the President similarly 
runs afoul of the Constitution. "73 
Several federal district courts rejected the Synar analogy as a 
basis for invalidating the Guidelines. For example, in United States 
v. Ruiz- Villanueva,74 the Synar analogy failed for two reasons. First, 
the President does not control the Commission because the President 
appoints members of the Commission "by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate. "75 Second, because the Commission does not 
perform an exclusively judicial function, the President's removal 
power does not infringe on the judicial branch.76 
The Synar analogy was also rejected by the district court in 
United States v. Chambless.77 In Chambless, the court applied a 
functional analysis,78 finding that even though the "Commission is 
situated in the judicial branch, the duties imposed on the Commission 
are . . . executive in nature. "79 Because the court considered' the 
Commission functionally executive, it held that the President's re-
moval power was constitutionally proper. 80 The court did not, how-
ever, discuss whether it is impermissible for the executive branch to 
participate in the judicial branch by reason of the President's power 
to appoint the commissioners. 
In Mistretta v. United States,8! John M. Mistretta and Nancy 
L. Ruxlow were indicted on three counts relating to the sale of 
cocaine.82 The United States District Court for the Western District 
of Missouri denied Mistretta's motion to have the Guidelines inval-
idated as an excessive delegation of legislative authority and a violation 
70. United States v. Frank, 682 F. Supp. 815, 821 (W.O. Pa. 1988) (citing United 
States v. Ruiz-Villanueva, 680 F. Supp. 1411, 1423 (S.D. Cal. 1988» (Frank 
avoided this issue by deciding that the location of the Commission in the 
judicial branch violated art. III, § 2, cl. 2 of the Constitution). 
71. 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
72. Id. at 723. 
73. Ruiz- Villanueva, 680 F. Supp. at 1423. 
74. Id. at 1411. 
75. Id. at 1423 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 991(a». 
76. Id. at 1424 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 991(a». 
77. 680 F. Supp. 793, 802 (E.D. La. 1988). 
78.Id. 
79.Id. 
80.Id. 
81. 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
82. Id. at 370. 
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of the separation of powers doctrine. 83 The court held that the 
Commission was constitutionally sound and that the Guidelines did 
not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of power. 84 Mistretta 
subsequently pleaded guilty to "conspiracy and agreement to distrib-
ute cocaine," and the remaining counts were dismissed. 8s He was 
sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment with three years of 
supervised release and fined over $1,000.86 Mistretta appealed to the 
Eighth Circuit.87 Both Mistretta and the United States, pursuant to 
Supreme Court Rule 18, petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari 
before judgment.88 The Court granted certiorari89 because of the 
public importance of the issue and the disarray of the federal district 
courts.90 
In an eight-to-one decision ,91 the Supreme Court affirmed the 
district court's decision. Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, 
held the Guidelines constitutional on delegation of power and sepa-
ration of power grounds.92 
Beginning its analysis with the nondelegation doctrine, the Court 
applied the "intelligible principle" test set forth in J. W. Hampton, 
Jr., & Co. v. United States.93 The Court stated that because Congress 
cannot properly perform its job without the ability to delegate power, 
it is sufficient if Congress "lay[s] down by legislative act an intelligible 
principle" delineating the policy and the boundaries of such author-
ity.94 The Court found that Congress provided "detailed guidance" 
to the Commission and "overarching constraints" on the formation 
of the Guidelines.9s Despite the Commission's significant discretion 
in formulating the Guidelines, the exhaustive task of their formation 
is "precisely the sort of intricate, labor-intensive task for which 
delegation to an expert body is especially appropriate."96 The Court 
concluded that Congress had not delegated excessive power because 
83. [d. 
84. United States v. Johnson, 682 F. Supp. 1033, 1035 (W.D. Mo. 1988), aff'd 
sub nom. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
85. Mistretta, 488 U.S at 370. 
86. [d. at 371. 
87. [d. 
88. [d. 
89. [d. 
90. [d. 
91. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Marshall, Stevens, O'Connor, and 
Kennedy joined Justice Blackmun's opinion. Justice \ Brennan joined Justice 
Blackmun's opinion in all but n.ll. See infra note 121. 
92. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 412. 
93. 276 U.S. 394 (1928). 
94. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372 (quoting J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co., 276 U.S. at 
409). 
95. [d. at 376. 
96. [d. at 379. 
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the delegation of authority was "sufficiently specific and detailed to 
meet the constitutional requirements.' '97 
Turning to the separation of powers doctrine, the Court rejected 
the notion that the three branches of government must be totally 
separate and distinct.98 Instead, the Court applied a flexible view of 
separation of powers, observing that the constitutional system im-
poses a degree of overlapping responsibility.99 There are, conse-
quently, "twilight areas" where the activities of the branches merge. lOO 
In applying the separation of powers doctrine, the Court first 
looked at the placement of the Commission in the judicial branch. 
Although prior decisions focused on whether there was interference 
with another branch,lol the Mistretta Court applied a "not more 
appropriate to another branch" standard. 102 Admitting that the place-
ment of the Commission in the judicial branch was unusual, the 
Court refused to hold the placement unconstitutional because the 
Commission's activities were not more appropriately performed by 
one of the other branches. t03 The judiciary may perform nonadju-
dicatory functions that are appropriate and do not "trench upon the 
prerogatives of another Branch."I04 
Second, the Court examined whether the participation of federal 
judges on the Commission interfered with the judicial branch. While 
adhering to the general rule that an article III judge may not 
undertake "executive or administrative duties of a nonjudicial na-
ture," tOS the Court did not believe that the requirement of article III 
judges on the Commission impeded the function of the judicial 
branch. 106 Additionally, there is no explicit constitutional prohibition 
upon federal judges serving on independent commissions. t07 
The Court observed that there is a tradition of extra-
judicial service,108 and after enumerating several notable 
97. [d. at 374. 
98. [d. at 380. The Court observed that the security against the excessive authority 
of one branch "lies not in a hermetic division between the Branches, but in a 
carefully crafted system of checked and balanced power within each Branch." 
[d. at 381. 
99. [d. 
100. [d. at 386. The Court cited as an example Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 
1 (1941), where it upheld the power of the judiciary to promulgate the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 386. 
101. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
102. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 385. 
103. [d. at 384-85. 
104. [d. at 388. 
105. [d. at 385 (citing Olson, 487 U.S. at 677 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
1, 123 (1976) (per curiam))). 
106. [d. at 395-96. 
107. [d. at 397. 
108. [d. at 400 & n.23. 
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examples,I09 the Court held that the separation of powers doctrine 
does not prohibit article III judges from participating in "certain 
extrajudicial activity." 110 Further, the Court believed that the inclu-
sion of federal judges enhanced the makeup of the Commission. 
By enlisting federal judges, the Commission is assured experience 
and expertise in the area of sentencing. II I 
Finally, the Court turned to the President's power to remove 
members of the Commission for cause. The Court held that the 
President's removal power did not violate the separation of powers 
doctrine. 112 Because the Act did not diminish the status of the article 
III judges as judges, the President's removal power posed a negligible 
threat to judicial independence. 1I3 Even if a judge was removed from 
the Commission, absent impeachment, the judge would continue 
serving as a federal judge.u4 Thus, the Court found that there was 
"no risk that the President's limited removal power would compro-
mise the impartiality of Article III judges serving on the Commission 
and, consequently, no risk that the Act's removal provision would 
prevent the Judicial Branch from performing its constitutionally 
assigned function." liS 
Justice Scalia dissented, arguing that the formation of the Com-
mission violated the separation of powers doctrine. 116 Justice Scalia 
, reasoned that the Commission's only responsibility is establishing the 
Guidelines, which is a "legislative" function.1I7 
The Supreme Court's decision to hold the Guidelines constitu-
tional is supported by sound application of prior case law, proper 
exercise of judicial deference to a congressional decision, and regard 
for public policy. 
Although the general rule is that Congress may not "delegate 
its legislative power to another Branch,"lIs the nondelegation doctrine 
does not completely bar Congress from granting the coordinate 
branches a portion of its power. 119 As long as Congress provides 
109. Id. The examples included five Justices participating on the election commission 
that resolved the contested Presidential election of 1876; Justice Robert's 
participation on the commission that investigated the attack on Pearl Harbor; 
Justice Jackson's service as a prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials; and Chief 
Justice Warren's service on the commission investigating the assassination of 
President Kennedy. 
110. Id. at 401. 
111. Id. at 408. 
112. Id. at 411 n.35. 
113. Id. at 410. 
114. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1). 
115. Id. at 411. 
116. Id. at 426-47 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
117. Id. at 420-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
118. Id. at 371-72 (citing Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892». 
119. Id. 
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intelligible principles to which the recipient of the power must con-
form, the delegation of legislative power is not prohibited. l20 
Congress could not have been more specific in delegating the 
authority to the Commission to formulate the Guidelines. Congress 
clearly specified the purposes of the Commission. 121 In addition, 
Congress specified that sentencing ranges must be consistent with the 
pertinent provisions of title 18 and must reflect current average 
sentences. 122 Moreover, Congress established statutory factors for 
each sentencing question 123 that the Commission was to consider in 
formulating the Guidelines. 124 Finally, Congress set forth several 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances to be considered by the 
Commission. 125 
120. [d. at 372 (citing J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 
409 (1928». 
121. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (1988); see also supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text. 
122. Under 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1988), the Guidelines must be "consistent with all 
pertinent provisions of ... title 18." [d. § 994(a). Under 28 U.S.C. § 
991(b)(1)(A) (1988), the Commission must meet the sentencing purposes set 
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1988), which provide that the sentence is: 
[d. 
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to provide respect for 
the law, and to provide punishment for the offense; 
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational 
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most 
effective manner. 
123. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 376-77. In footnote 11 to the Court's opinion, Justice 
Blackmun acknowledged the range of the Commission's discretion by assuming 
that Congress had given the Commission the authority to reinstate the federal 
death penalty. Justice Brennan declined to join this part of the Court's opinion. 
124. 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(1)-(7) (1988). Section 994(c) provides that the circumstances 
to be considered in establishing categories of offenses are: 
(1) the grade of the offense; 
[d. 
(2) the circumstances under which the offense was committed which 
mitigate or aggravate the seriousness of the offense; 
(3) the nature and degree of the harm caused by the offense, including 
whether it involved property, irreplaceable property, a person, a 
number of persons, or a breach of public trust; 
(4) the community view of the gravity of the offense; 
(5) the public concern generated by the offense; 
(6) the deterrent effect a particular sentence may have on the com-
mission of the offense by others; and 
(7) the current inl.:idence of the offense in the community and in the 
Nation as a whole. 
125. [d. § 994(d)(I)-(1l). The aggravating and mitigating factors are: 
(1) age; 
(2) education; 
(3) vocational skills; 
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Notwithstanding the nondelegation doctrine, historically Con-
gress has frequently delegated its power to define punishment to the 
coordinate branches. For example, the Federal Probation Act granted 
federal judges the power to place defendants on probation. 126 In 
addition, Congress established the United States Parole Board as an 
agency of the executive branch. 127 Furthermore, Congress has dele-
gated to the executive branch full authority to establish punishments 
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 128 
If the nondelegation doctrine endures as a fundamental element 
of the Constitution, it has remained largely inactive. No delegation 
of congressional power has failed for indefiniteness since 1935. 129 In 
Mistretta, because of the deference accorded to Congress by the 
Court and the articulate guidance provided to the Commission by 
Congress, the decision that the Guidelines were not the result of an 
excessive delegation of power was in harmony with stare decisis. 
Although the Supreme Court has invalidated previous attempts 
to reassign constitutionally-vested powers,130 statutory provisions that 
pose no danger of encroaching upon the province of the coordinate 
branches have been upheld. l3l 
Placing the Commission within the judiciary has not interfered 
with the role of the other branches. 132 Prior to the establishment of 
the Guidelines, it was a member of the judicial branch (the trial 
judge) who determined criminal sentences.133 The relationship between 
[d. 
(4) mental and emotional condition to the extent that such condition 
mitigates the defendant's culpability or to the extent that such con-
dition is otherwise plainly relevant; 
(5) physical condition, including drug dependence; 
(6) previous employment record; 
(7) family ties and responsibilities; 
(8) community ties; 
(9) role in the offense; 
(10) criminal history; and 
(11) degree of dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood. 
126. See Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220-21 (1932). 
127. See Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 50 (1916). 
I 
128. 10 U.S.C. § 856 (1988) (delegates to the President the power to prescribe the 
limits on military punishments). 
129. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373; see also A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 
(1935). (The Court, in both cases, held that the National Industrial Recovery 
Act was an invalid delegation of legislative power to the President.). 
130. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (Congress may not retain the 
right to remove an officer appointed to the executive branch.). 
131. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (The Court upheld the 
judicial appointment of an independent counsel.). 
132. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 385. 
133. See id. at 395. 
628 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 19 
the branches has not changed. 134 The location of the Commission in 
the judicial branch did not intrude upon the coordinate branches to 
any greater extent than when a trial judge has determined the 
appropriate sentence for a criminal defendant. 13s 
It has been argued that if the words "in the judicial branch" 
render the Guidelines unconstitutional, then such language could be 
severed, and the remainder of the Act upheld. 136 The courts, however, 
are reluctant to perform a task which would thwart congressional 
intent. 137 The canon of construction that presumes constitutionality 
does not empower courts to rewrite statutes to avoid a question of 
constitutionality. J38 Furthermore, the legislative history supports the 
conclusion that the legislative intent was to locate the Commission 
within the judicial branch. 139 
The Department of Justice has advocated placing the Commis-
sion within the executive branch to avoid constitutional separation 
of power problems. l40 However, attempting this "cure" for uncon-
stitutionality would raise further separation of powers questions. A 
minimum of three article III federal judges are required to serve on 
the Commission. If the location of the Commission was within the 
executive branch, members of the judiciary would be carrying out 
executive functions, thus compromising the independence of both the 
judicial and executive branches. Although there is an analogy be-
tween the Parole Commission and the Sentencing Commission, "the 
conceptual basis for the Parole Commission's authority lies in the 
executive branch's power to execute judgments and its power to 
pardon. "141 The Commission determines proper sentences for specific 
levels of crimes. Even if the Commission is formally moved, or 
considered an "executive" agency by function, the Act may still face 
constitutional challenges based upon the composition of the 
134. [d. 
135. [d. 
136. Brief for Respondent at 40, Mistretta (Nos. 87-1904 & 87-7028). 
137. See United States v. Arnold, 678 F. Supp. 1463, 1470 (S.D. Cal. 1988). 
"[T]ransfer of the Commission from the Judicial Branch to a different branch 
or to an independent status would appear to unduly frustrate Congressional 
intent." [d.; see also United States v. Tolbert, 682 F. Supp. 1517, 1525 (D. 
Kan. 1988) (The court declined "to rewrite the Sentencing Reform Act in order 
to place the Commission within the executive branch. "). 
138. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841 (1986). 
139. "The better view is that the sentencing should be within the province of the 
judiciary." S. REp. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1983), reprinted in 1984 
U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3237. 
140. See United States v. Bolding, 683 F. Supp. 1003, 1004 n.l (D. Md. 1988), 
rev'd, 876 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1989). 
141. [d. 
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Commission. 142 Thus, Congress's decision to place the Commission 
within the judiciary is appropriate because there has been no showing 
that its placement within the judiciary trespasses upon the dominion 
of the coordinate branches. Moreover, there is no more suitable place 
for such a commission. A commission that performs one of the 
functions traditionally performed by the judicial branch is properly 
located within the judicial branch. 
Although the Supreme Court has determined that article III 
judges may not perform nonjudicial functions in their capacity as 
judges,143 and has held that as article III judges they may not perform 
administrative duties of a nonjudicial executive nature,l44 the Court 
has not suggested that article III judges may not perform a judicial 
function in their capacity as commissioners. Therefore, to withstand 
the challenge, the service of the judges on the Commission must be 
of a judicial nature and in a nonjudicial capacity. 
In this situation, the function of the judges on the Commission 
is not to perform the function of an executive officer, but to 
determine appropriate sentences, which is a judicial function. Because 
the judges are performing duties of a judicial nature rather than an 
executive nature, the prohibition expressed in Morrison v. Olson 14s 
is not applicable. Additionally, because the judges are acting as 
commissioners and not as judges, they are serving in a nonjudicial 
capacity, and the principle that they as judges should not perform 
nonjudicial functions does not apply. 146 
The tradition of service by federal judges in nonjudicial roles 
has been well established. 147 Furthermore, one can hardly find ade-
quate ground for believing that the framers of the Constitution would 
142. See United States v. Arnold, 678 F. Supp. 1463 (S.D. Cal. 1988) (concluding 
that the presence of article III judges on the Commission violated separation 
of powers). 
143. See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 (1792). 
144. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677 (1988) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 123 (1976) (per curiam». 
145. [d. at 654. 
146. One federal court reasoned that because the Commissioners do not decide cases 
or controversies, "inclusion of Article III judges on the Commission does not 
violate the separation of powers doctrine." United States v. Costelon, 694 F. 
Supp. 786, 792-93 (D. Colo. 1988). However, this line of reasoning may result 
in the court being hoisted by its own petard. To declare that the Commission 
does not decide cases or controversies may implicitly suggest that the Com-
mission is improperly within the judicial branch. 
147. See, e.g., Brief for the United States Sentencing Commission at 41, Mistretta 
(Nos. 87-1904 & 87-7028). If it was valid for Marshall to serve as Secretary of 
State and Jay as Ambassador to Great Britain, for Justice Jackson to prosecute 
at Nuremberg, and for Chief Justice Warren to investigate the Kennedy 
assassination, it would surely be anomalous to conclude that three circuit judges 
may not participate in the work of the Commission. [d. 
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prevent persons experienced in sentencing from participating in a 
commission formed for that very purpose. Any slight overlap of 
branches would undoubtedly be outweighed by the benefits of having 
accomplished judges participate in the promulgation and review of 
the Guidelines. The alternative of having no judicial participation in 
the development of the Guidelines is a far less desirable option. 
Although in Synarl48 the Supreme Court invalidated a scheme 
by which Congress, acting alone, could dismiss a member of the 
executive branch,149 a distinction from Synar may be drawn. In Synar, 
Congress did not have power over the Comptroller General. lso "No 
impermissible transfer of authority out of the Executive Branch 
occurs because the Executive Branch retains control through appoint-
ment and removal." lSI The congressional act in Synar was held 
unconstitutional because one branch had the power to discharge an 
official appointed by another branch.1S2 In Mistretta, however, it is 
the President who appoints and removes the judges as commission-
ers.iS3 The President's power over the Commission does not imper-
missibly interfere with the judiciary.ls4 The Act does not grant the 
President the power to remove the judges from their posts as article 
III judges. ISS Moreover, the President has not been granted the power 
to interfere with the impartial adjudication of cases before article III 
judges. ls6 
The initial consequence of the Supreme Court's decision is the 
resentencing of all persons convicted of federal crimes after November 
1987 who were not sentenced according to the Guidelines.1S7 In some 
cases, where a defendant has relied on a district court's holding that 
the Guidelines were unconstitutional, there may be grounds for a 
new trial. Next, because the Act redefines parolels8 and limits 
148. 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
149. [d. at 726-34. 
150. [d. 
151. United States v. Schwartz, 692 F. Supp. 331, 339 (D. Del. 1988). 
152. 478 U.S. at 726-34. 
153. 28 U .S.C. § 991(a) (1988). 
154. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 410. 
155. [d. 
156. [d. at 411. 
157. Some courts have had the wisdom to sentence according to the Guidelines, 
even though they held them unconstitutional, thus avoiding an unfortunate 
waste of judicial resources. See, e.g., United States v. Bolding, 683 F. Supp. 
1003, 1004 (D. Md. 1988), rev'd, 876 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1989). 
158. 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (1988). Section 3624(b) provides that prisoners who serve 
one year or more, other than a life term, are automatically credited with 54 
days toward their sentence, unless the prisoner has not complied with the 
institutional regulations. [d. § 3624(b). 
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probationlS9 for all offenses governed by the Guidelines, changes in 
plea bargaining may develop. 
The Guidelines may afford defendants another avenue of ap-
pellate review. Formerly, appellate courts gave the sentencing judge 
almost unconditional deference in determining the appropriate sen-
tence. l60 Under the Guidelines, however, a defendant may appeal a 
sentence that the defendant considers an incorrect application of the 
Guidelines or is outside of the Guidelines. 161 
Finally, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges will be re-
quired to become familiar with the Guidelines and the provisions of 
the ACt. 162 There may be some offenses for which no Guidelines are 
provided because of unusual circumstances. In such instances, the 
trial judge has the discretion to impose a sentence after considering 
certain factors, such as the Guidelines provided for similar offenses. 163 
It remains to be seen, however, how liberally judges will use the 
unusual circumstances provision. The various districts are likely to 
disagree as to what constitutes an unusual circumstance and to what 
degree they should depart from the Guidelines. 
The Supreme Court has ruled that the Guidelines are constitu-
tional because by creating the Commission, Congress neither exces-
sively delegated legislative power nor violated the separation of 
powers doctrine. The decision to uphold the Guidelines was consistent 
with prevailing constitutional principles and the intentions of Con-
gress. There remains, however, the possibility that the Guidelines will 
be challenged on other grounds such as due process or the eighth 
amendment. 
The Court and the Commission have recognized that the refor-
mation of the federal criminal sentencing system is an enormous 
task. The value of a criminal justice system with less sentencing 
disparity is outweighed by whatever harm, if any, may arise from 
the slight overlap of authority among the branches. The constitu-
tionality of the Guidelines should not rest upon the slender reed of 
interbranch balancing, but rather, upon the merit of fairness to 
159. Id. §§ 3561-3566. 
160. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 364; see also Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial 
Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 635, 663 (1971). 
161. 18 U .S.C. § 3742(a)(2)-(3) (1988). The government may also file a notice of 
appeal on the same grounds. Id. § 3742(b)(2)-(3). 
162. For an introduction to the application of the Guidelines from a practitioner's 
perspective, see Cassella, A Step-by-Step Guide to the New Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 34 PRAC. LAW. 13 (Apr. 1988). 
163. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988) provides the trial judge with the discretion to 
impose "an appropriate sentence, having due regard for the relationship of 
the sentence imposed to sentences prescribed by guidelines applicable to similar 
offenses and offenders." Id. 
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defendants, prosecutors, and defenders, and not incidently, improved 
governmental efficiency. 
Stanley Turk 
